Introduction
The events that characterize the current security environment have confirmed that insecurity, uncertainty and unpredictability persist. It is therefore necessary to rethink the geopolitical and geostrategic environment in terms of the interests, diversity of conventional and nonconventional, asymmetric and hybrid threats, actors involved, and reconfigure new strategies to effectively manage these complex situations. The concepts of security have the role of explaining and arguing the positions and attitudes of the political-military leaders towards the events in the transatlantic and external internal security environment. The operational, strategic and political analysis of the transatlantic space can explain the factors that structurally and institutionally influence the security relations in this security community. The operational dimension of transatlantic security focuses on the analysis of two complementary axes: the axis of capabilities that includes the military, technological and economic resources available to the countries of the transatlantic space and the political-military axis, which makes a direct link between these capabilities and military and policy decision-makers. The strategic dimension of transatlantic security seeks to highlight the differences or approaches between security policy decisions contained in national security strategies or international organizations, with the strategic culture these countries or organizations have developed over time. The political dimension highlights the complexity of the transatlantic security space and how certain variables can influence positively or negatively security regardless of the operational or strategic dimension of the security community.
Concepts of Transatlantic Security
Transatlantic security appears to be a particular area of reference. It joins a theoretical concept derived from the study of international relations, a model derived from the historical reality of building relations between the United States of America and Western European countries after the Second World War. Transatlantic security, together with economics and finance, is a major focus of transatlantic relations. Specialty literature deals with the two chained components, precisely because of the importance of security for transatlantic relations. The concept of transatlantic security offers both a theoretical contextualization and the identification of the geographic space of analysis through a comprehensive approach to the factors and actors that constitute and contribute to transatlantic security. The way of approaching transatlantic security is different on the two sides of the Atlantic. The first, represented by the crisis of the transatlantic relations in 2003 and due to US intervention in Iraq, brought to the forefront the contradiction between the US and its traditional European partners over the opportunity and the legality of the intervention, even questioning the institutional security partnership. The second issue of the ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) development has coagulated research around the relationship between NATO and EU, the interaction between the two institutions and the responsibilities of each. Transatlantic security has become almost synonymous with NATO, turning this institution into a barometer of the transatlantic security relationship. Constrained by the institutional barriers of NATO and ESDP, the analysis of transatlantic security is reduced to a limited interpretation by eliminating some theoretical factors, actors or interpretations. Thus, the transatlantic security perceived as an interaction between NATO and the EU focuses on internal functional aspects, on how European security ambitions seek to find an autonomous institutional expression capable of operating independently or in cooperation with NATO. This type of approach highlights the internal dimension of transatlantic space security, as threats come from outside and is important for understanding the processes that influence transatlantic relations. The geopolitical changes in recent years have prompted US and European analysts to speak of a "division of labor" outside of the transatlantic security space in an attempt to unleash the transatlantic dialogue in the sphere of NATO-EU internal relations. This "division of labor" would enable the US to focus on the new great power of the AsiaPacific region, while the European partners should create a strategic relationship with the Russian Federation and Turkey. The analysis of the security of the transatlantic space suffers from the lack of an integrative reference system in which the contribution of one or other of the States to the joint security effort can be assessed on the basis of similar criteria. If the US contribution to transatlantic security is clear, at least at the capabilities level, the contribution of the other transatlantic security countries to this joint effort is judged by different criteria in which, in most cases, quantitative factors are ignored or omitted in favoring qualitative interpretations. The concept of security community emerged in the early 1950s when the Cold War threw the Western and Soviet worlds on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The role of this concept was given by trying to find solutions to avoid escalating any conflict by creating a different perspective where peace, as a goal in itself, would be the primary element. In the theory of international relations, the term security community was introduced by Richard W. van Wagenen in 1952 that proposed a vision of a world without wars by initiating an integration process that "allows for a sense of community accompanied by formal institutions and practices and informal sufficiently powerful and widespread to ensure a peaceful change within a group" [1] . In the socio-constructivist vision of security communities, Karl W. Deutsch approaches the concept of a security community through two perspectives: the first, in which humanity is perceived as an unbroken string of wars that will continue indefinitely, the second as a development continuation of the society that will live in peace in one community [2] . From a security point of view, the security community exists in a real space where the possibility of violence and war is permanent. Deutsch emphasizes the primordial importance of political and administrative capabilities and the importance of links and communication between policymakers and institutions, providing effective communication channels both horizontally between different security community units and vertically between relevant policy levels [2] . Deutsch emphasizes the importance of economic development as a prerequisite for maintaining a security community where economic conditions allow the equalization of living standards within the community and an advantageous exchange that results in common benefits within an integrated community [2] . This process of equalization would translate into the emergence of a strong middle class and would enable the community to become more international. Deutsch, however, does not refer to global peace but is limited to the level of the transatlantic security community, underlining that the integrative process brings with it some common economic benefits. From a security point of view, security communities enhance their capabilities and channels of communication through security co-operation and cooperation, through stronger military integration, coordination of policies against internal threats, internationalization of authority, and multi-perspective policies where rules are shared at national, transnational and supranational level [3] . In the classic version of realism, the confrontation between states is explained as a consequence of the aggressive behavior of power-minded political leaders who, using circumstances, pursue their own purposes and interests. Under these circumstances, any state would be a potential security issue, the only solution to securing its own security remains the accumulation of a superior economic and military capability. The security approach, known as structural offensive realism, highlights the idea that states, and mainly major powers, are forced to maximize their "relative" power to other states to secure their security and survival. States, using appropriate circumstances and well-defined strategies, can develop their relative power without triggering counterresponses from other states, thus turning into regional leaders. This security approach sees the need of the state to secure a hegemonic position as the main cause of international insecurity. States resort to blackmail or war to secure the necessary resources or to stop other states from gaining access to them. When they are unable to achieve their own goals, states are in conflict with other states, temporarily maximizing their own "relative" power. In Stephen Walt's opinion, "in an anarchic system states seek to form alliances to protect themselves" [4] . Liberalism is inextricably linked to two concepts. The first states that peace is more cost-effective than war, trade being a much less costly alternative to wealth than sanctions or coercive means [5] . The second important liberal concept, later emerged, is that of neoliberal institutionalism. It focuses on the role of international organizations in avoiding conflicts and managing the postconflict stage at regional and international level. The main feature of international organizations is the limitation of the anarchic character of the international system through a set of rules, along with the mediation and arbitrary capacity of conflict. An important attribute in this liberal interpretation is the primacy of the state as the main agent contributing to the emergence of institutions and, at the same time, taking advantage of them by pursuing common interests with other states [5] . Security institutions have the ability to alleviate fears among group members because they allow early identification of changes in behavioural patterns, including changes in military spending, disposition of units and their planning or projection on the ground [3] . The European Union is, by excellence, the example of a partially mixed security community that incorporates both economic and institutional liberalism based on the need to build a space of peace.
3.Transatlantic security space analysis context
The transatlantic security space has a double valence. The first is space transatlantic, which defines the transatlantic security community. The second is the interaction between the transatlantic space and the adjacent regionsand with the exogenous factors that come from them. Each of them operates according to different rules, both contributing to the security of this space. The concept of a transatlantic security community provides explanations on the processes and functionality within this space. The world around this community operates clearly differently, with the outer space of security communities being primarily subject to the need for security, the provision of resources and the maximization of one's own interests. The last global conflict and then, above all, the ideological conflict it has followed, led to institutional rapprochement between the two sides of the Atlantic. The Second World War completely devastated the continent from west to east. The former great powers, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, destroyed by war, left the place to the new extra-continental powers, the US and the USSR, and a new kind of conflict, animated to the same degree by ideological differences and the desire for continental supremacy. The "New Order," thought by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, hit the empty rhetoric of the "communist fraternity." Under this ideological coverage, the Cold War gained momentum. Inside Western Europe, however, the old fears have not disappeared. [6] . The Americans, however, saw farther than just European rivalries. Under the influence of Truman's doctrine, which was based on a containment policy, the US sought to attract allied countries outside or outside Western Europe, such as Greece and Turkey. Under the direct threat of the Soviet Union and lacking British support after the end of the war, Turkey was glad to accept the US economic aid and NATO membership, considering it to be a new opportunity to affirm its European vocation and at the same time to ensure security against the Soviet threat. In 1952, Federal Germany became a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. This inclusion actually finalizes the beginning of the transatlantic security skeleton. This configuration is the core of transatlantic security that later on, as the continent democratizes, will support the structure of today. Strategic military considerations prevailed against the scepticism of Western European politicians, fear of possible German rearmament moving to a second level. This moment signals the end of the Franco-German antagonism and finally deprives the UK of the possibility of intervening in the balance of European power on either side. Only from this moment we can talk about the existence of two transatlantic poles, America and Western Europe. Transatlantic security, as it is today, can, however, be duplicated in other regions, starting from different circumstances.
The transatlantic security space issue
Today we can talk about two security communities that are very strong in the Euro-Atlantic area. The first is a pluralist security community that includes NATO member countries, those of the EU plus Switzerland. Within this community, we are dealing with a semi-amalgamated security community made up of EU Member States. NATO space is identified as a pluralist security community, based on its intergovernmental character and the institutional security role that this alliance began to play since the fall of the Iron Curtain. Security specialists felt that NATO should be understood as a security institution and not as a mere defensive alliance, and the transformation of NATO's role is very important, due to the widening of the scope and the area of interest [5] . NATO transformation from the alliance into a security institution explains the persistence of the North Atlantic Alliance after the end of the Cold War, and is particularly noticeable at the level of the relationship with the environment, admission criteria, the area of functionality, and even security concepts. Transformation is even more apparent in comparison to military alliances such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The transatlantic security space now offers the image of a multi-layer community in which their spatiality and functionality overlap and, in some cases, intertwine. The transatlantic relationship is one of the few that can be called strategic because of the degree of civilization, military, and economic integration. Conceptually, the transatlantic space is the only one able to resize by propagating its values in geographically or civilization ally unconnected regions. Attempts by other power poles to cluster around disparate geographic areas based on shared values have so far failed in the case of the Russian Federation or China. The attempts of the Arab and Muslim states to create a common space of the transatlantic caliber have also failed. But the transatlantic model is not without problems. Within it there are two different types of American and European approaches, and experience shows that the functionality and expansion of this space depends, without exception, on achieving a common viewpoint and combining security and economic factors. For the time being, the security component is an apple of discord in transatlantic relations. The transatlantic space, geographically defined by both sides of the North Atlantic, is structured around two institutional components, NATO and the EU. This space includes four types of actors: NATO and EU member states, NATO member states only, EU member states only and, last but not least, countries that would almost automatically trigger an intervention, including military, of NATO or EU in case of security challenges. The concept thus has a static representation of its components and, at the same time, a dynamic one of the relationships and interests it carries with itself outside the security community. The process of integration that takes place in the transatlantic space requires the transatlantic security community to act as a "common body" in the face of external threats. In fact, this integration has been achieved only at different levels, and for this reason, the security behavior of the actors in this space is heteroclimate. The major differences between the national capabilities, their contribution to common security, the different neighborhoods faced by the actors, the differences in strategic culture inherited over the course of history, the different economic and energy resources, the different social structure of the states and the functioning of the institutions in this community security contribute to the lack of homogeneity of security and defense policies.
Contributions to transatlantic security
Transatlantic security encompasses a large number of state actors that are joined by supra-state actors in different integration or cooperation relations. No transatlantic security analysis can circumvent the US, the world's leading economic and military power, the most important partner within NATO, deeply involved in the European security. Despite significant material and material cuts, the US still maintains a significant number of bases in Western Europe and, following NATO enlargement in recent years, in south-eastern Europe and Turkey. Together, by their mere presence on the continent, they are a solid deterrent to the number and quality of troops and their level of equipment. To this itis added a nuclear deterrent component that remained operational after the end of the Cold War. The naval forces located in the Mediterranean are putting the US at the top of the list of European naval forces. Germany has a special status for several reasons. Having long been a status a military occupied country, Germany was received with reservations in NATO. The defeat suffered in the Second World War imposed a special status for Germany on civilmilitary relations. Germany is the only European country whose army is numerically limited to a maximum of 370,000 people in peacetime, a figure imposed by third countries. At the same time, Germany is the first economy in Europe, with a highly military-industrial complex. Germany is a supporter of the development of a common European security component and a supporter of NATO and of the American involvement in continental security. In addition to its direct influence, Germany also influences the perception of other countries on security issues.
In the context of transatlantic security, a special case is represented by non-aligned military countries, countries which, although not part of NATO, enjoy indirect protection from this organization. These countries, in turn, have an important influence on European security and especially on EU enlargement. From the group of these countries, Sweden is the country with the most powerful military-industrial potential. Sweden is one of the most powerful states in the EU's military point of view, investing more in defense budget, research and development than Italy or the Netherlands. At the same time, through foreign policy oriented to the "human" security dimension, Sweden contributes to the development of a non-military approach to security issues [7] . An important security actor in the immediate vicinity of the transatlantic space is the Russian Federation. Located in the EuroAtlantic security area, Russia is the main continental security interlocutor, partner in NATO, a major supplier of energy resources and, last but not least, its own sphere of influence in the former Soviet space in Europe, the Caucasus and CentralAsia. Transatlantic security interests are competing with the Russian Federation in this area due to several factors, the most important of which is energy (Caspian resources are an alternative to Russian hydrocarbons). The Russian Federation considered the former Soviet republics as part of its immediate neighborhood and acted consistently to re-establish its authority over the governments of the new independent republics. After the loss of the three Baltic republics, Russia turned its attention to Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, but also to the Caucasus and Central Asian republics. Thus, Russia pursued its interests in its area of influence, capturing in part or in full the gas distribution systems in the Caspian Sea and imposing the purchase prices in the former Soviet countries and the selling price to Europe. This strategy managed to resuscitate the Russian economy and the immediate consequence was the significant increase of the budget for defense and the increase of the military expenses. Iran, a state with significant geostrategic potential, is in the same area that, through the policy of its nuclear ambitions, influences the security situation in Europe as well as in the Middle East. The relationship between the Russian Federation and Iran complicates the security situation, especially through the competition for the establishment of a regional leader, a competition involving Turkey as well. Last but not least, the very good economic relations between the Russian Federation and Turkey could considerably affect transatlantic security and Western interests in this area. The transatlantic space is evolving continuously in terms of capabilities. The EU has evolved into a normative power in which the values of democracy, human rights and good governance have taken the place of military and military approaches. For years, the EU has been in a process of development and at the same time of integrating its own defense capabilities, pursuing, through its policies, to streamline defense spending and to develop cooperation between the various components of the European defense industry. The idea of a common European defense industry market has, however, hit many national obstacles. For these reasons, defense remains the last national "bastion" in a Europe where sovereignty is increasingly limited. The enlargement of the EU towards the East cemented the image of a Europe with alternative security interpretations, in which norms and values became the current currency of discourse leaders in Brussels, and the consistent respect of values determines the credibility and external influence of the EU. This is to try to build a positive image of interventions and intentions in security issues. Mainly, Europeans have dedicated themselves to civilian missions, focusing on the humanitarian nature of interventions, the security component in the EU vision, and have to support its civilian efforts. This vision signifies the desire not to limit European intervention only to peacebuilding missions but to extend them to humanitarian, economic, military and legal actions. Civil-military operations required the development of military capabilities that could be deployed in military operations theaters. True to its approach, the EU took advantage of the concept of Artemis, the EU Military Rapid Response Concept (EUMRRC), to develop rapid response capabilities in the form of Battlegroups. The concept also envisaged the development of logistical support, aerodrome, desant and sustainability logistics facilities [8] . The EU has demonstrated that it can organize a major civilian mission to work in a multinational framework. Civilian missions are joined by military missions such as Concordia and Congo. The EU has deployed civilian missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Iraq, monitoring missions at the border between Moldova and Ukraine, Gaza, Afghanistan or Georgia. What is important is that the EU has managed to set up and manage a pool of civilian experts from diverse fields, able to impose and support objectives aimed at improving the functioning of state structures in the states where it intervened. Civilian capabilities have been developed through the adoption by the EU Council of the Guidelines for the Civilian Operations in Crisis Management on 17 June 2007 (Council of the European Union, 2007). The document clarifies command and control structures in civilian crisis management operations, assigning functions, roles and responsibilities to the Civilian Operations Commander [8] . European civilian capabilities, by their multinational nature and the ability to work in cooperation with experts from other countries, can be considered as a success both from an institutional point of view and from the point of view of mission results. The development of European civilian capabilities allows bringing together the core and periphery of the transatlantic space in an integrative manner closer to the European idea than the collaborative form of NATO military capabilities. Unfortunately, the EU is reluctant to make available to American partners through NATO the civil expertise gained in recent years amid disagreements about the different strategic visions of the two transatlantic partners.
Conclusions
Making a comprehensive picture of transatlantic security capabilities is hard to figure out. The issue of transatlantic security concerns a significant number of policy researchers and analysts who, through their work, provide a publicly documented picture of security and foreign policy relations at regional and international level. In analyzing the transatlantic security space, it is necessary to identify the role and contributions of national and supra-national actors in this space to highlight its complexity, given by the number of actors involved and by the extent of the operational, strategic and political correlations that take place. We have highlighted the importance of developing a theoretical analysis framework that is capable of reaching a number of approaches, theories and interpretations capable of putting the analysis under consideration and the actors subject to it. Within the generic security community, there is a pluralist security community coalesced around the US and NATO, and a semi-amalgamated security community, the EU. The two communities overlap and, in some cases, intertwine but, due to the different criteria of training and functioning, are often inconsistent. In turn, the two communities focus on power poles, the United States for the pluralist security community, and the core of the industrialized countries of Western Europe, Germany, France, and the UK for the semiamalgamated security community. The two security communities and the two power poles react differently to the security environment, each of them having political and geopolitical interests that are not always the object of the internal relationship. In the Transatlantic Security Area, the complexity and number of formal and informal actors is so that the chances of obtaining positive results in foreign policy and security approaches depend on a set of appropriate circumstances that exist for a limited time. The process of expanding the Union and NATO to the east has been criticized on numerous occasions by the Russian Federation and even ignored by a too busy Western Europe with the Balkan crisis, the war on terror, or the integration process of the new democracies in central and Eastern Europe. Not once in the process of creating own and distinct security institutions and policies of transatlantic ones, the EU ignored the interests of its partners both within the transatlantic community and beyond. If misunderstandings and suspicions between transatlantic partners can be resolved through an expanded dialogue, relations with partners outside the transatlantic community are more difficult to manage.
